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1.
The German writer and critic Gotthold Ephraim Lessing recommends a little maxim by
Lactantius as a guide to criticism: 'primus sapientiae gradus est, falsa intelligere; secundus, vera cognoscere.' One should, Lessing wrote, "first seek out someone with whom to argue; one thereby gradually finds one's way into the question at issue, and the rest will follow of itself." Al 2 -though there is discussion (or at least talk) of immanent criticism by philosophers of quite different persuasions, working in separate areas and in different traditions of philosophy, almost all of them agree somewhat surprisingly on the same story about the its origins. The story is so widespread, it should be familiar to anyone who knows the literature. It is that Hegel invented imma 3 -nent criticism, that Marx later developed it, and that the various members of the Frankfurt School, particularly Adorno, refined it in various ways, and that they are all paradigmatic practitioners of immanent criticism. Continuity is the story from Hegel to Adorno, so let us call this 4 the Continuity Thesis. 5 There are four different claims in the Continuity Thesis that interest me.
i.
Hegel is the originator of immanent criticism. 6 ii.
Hegel's dialectical method is that of immanent criticism.
iii. Adorno practices immanent criticism and endorses the term as a description of his practice. iv Adorno's dialectical method is fundamentally Hegelian.
The first two claims concern Hegel, and the second two concern Adorno's theory and its relation to Hegel. As is usually the case with such stories that are supposed to help us make rough and ready sense of the history of philosophy, the truth is more complicated. In my view, though, this particular story is more of a hindrance than a help, and is in need of substantial revision.
2.
Before examining the thesis in more detail, we must say something about the concept of criticism, and of immanent criticism, whose putative origins are in question. Concisely formulated, to criticize immanently is to criticize an object 'on its own terms.' This is how 'immanent criticism' is usually presented, and how it is summarized in the relevant entry in Ritter's Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie: "the judgment of historical epochs, cultures, literary texts and so forth 'according to their own standards.'" Concision is commendable, but is only to be 7 had at the cost of considerable compression. So it will help to unpack the idea.
Let's begin with the component notion of criticism, which is itself a multifaceted concept. There 8 are actually seven facets worthy of comment, but I shall restrict myself to brief remarks on the four features most relevant to the present discussion. Criticism is a judgment (a), that is informed, discriminating and rational, which is always evaluative and sometimes normative (b) and nearly always negative (c) of an appropriate object of criticism, in the light of some standard (d) for a practical aim or purpose.
(a) A criticism is a judgment, which may be implicit or explicit. It need not take the grammatical form 's is p' and need not even be vocalized. Throwing a stone at the window of a bank, or burning a flag, are forms of judgment.
(b)Criticisms are evaluative judgements in the broadest sense. Some are also normative, in the sense that they appeal to norms (sometimes to moral norms) and thus have implications for what one ought to do. 9 (c) Criticism is almost invariably negative. We can see this in the Oxford English Dictionary definition of criticism, which is: "1. The action of criticizing, or passing judgement upon the qualities or merits of anything; esp. the passing of unfavourable judgement; faultfinding, censure" as evidence that criticism is virtually always negative. It is equally true however, that, in principle, criticism can be entirely positive. It is true of art criticism and 10 film criticism for example, although the same holds in principle, albeit much more rarely in practice, for social criticism. So it is certainly not a platitude that criticism is nearly 11 ! 2 always negative. Indeed, it is a good question why in practice most criticism tends to be so. 12 (d)Criticism, as a form of implicit or explicit judgment, has recourse to some kind of standard. For criticism is not just the passing of any old judgment, but of an 'informed'
'discriminating' and 'rational' judgment, and as such it rests on an appropriate standard.
This idea dates back to 18 th century notions about judgments of taste and beauty, but it is also firmly part of the commonplace view of immanent criticism.
3.
The above characterization of the concept of criticism, as a negative evaluative judge- This passage is about how to construct a self-grounding system of absolute philosophy. But it also propounds a version of the commonplace idea: the best way of refuting a philosophical system such as Spinoza's, Hegel claims, is to do so on its own grounds. So certainly Hegel has the commonplace idea of 'immanent criticism.' And even if he does not call it 'immanent criticism' he endorses it as a good method of philosophical criticism. Nevertheless, this does not support the claim that Hegel invented that idea. He was not the first to come up with it. Indeed, it was a philosophical commonplace in his day, and long before, that argument is the more successful at convincing people for being based on premises avowed by the opponent, or on the premises of the opponent's philosophical system. It might be claimed for example that this is the characteristic feature of the Socratic method of argumentation, and that therefore 'immanent criticism' in the commonplace sense originates with Socrates. 26
7.
But 'immanent criticism' as we have seen was also understood in the much richer sense as designating Hegel's dialectical method, the method that Hegel calls Science. It is of course much more plausible, not to say uncontroversial, to claim that Hegel originated the idea of 'immanent criticism' in that sense. All of which brings us to thesis ii, and the various difficulties that it poses.
Let us note, though, that thesis i cannot be rescued by interpreting it as a thesis about 'immanent criticism' in the rich Hegelian sense. For, once the notion of 'immanent criticism' is used to refer I don't mean by that an erotic ascent à la Plato, whereby lower forms of thought seek the higher for the sake of the higher. There is no Platonic heaven where the ideas are. If anything the 30 ascent in Hegel is driven from below. What makes the upwards movement necessary, according
to Hegel, is the internal contradiction in the initial category, a contradiction that it has merely by virtue of being finite (W 8, 172).
We can see what Hegel calls the contradiction in the finite in the very first transition of Hegel's Logic: Being, Nothing: and Becoming (W 8, 181). Hegel divides the dialectic into two moments.
The first is the "dialectic," strictly speaking, which is the moment of the "self-sublation of a finite category" and its "passing over into its contrary". This is what happens in the case of pure being, which because of its indeterminate immediacy passes into its opposite, nothing, which is what it is. The second moment is the "speculative" or "positive-rational" moment, which represents the unity of the previously opposed categories. Both the first moment, the dialectical moment strictly speaking, the passing of one finite category into its contrary, and the second, speculative moment, where the opposition is reconfigured as a higher unity, are essential to
Hegel's 'dialectical method'. My claim that there is an ascent is supposed to rule out that this a process of collapse and recuperation. Rather the transition marks a gain in complexity, refinement, stability, and coherence on the initial category and thus marks epistemological and ontological progress. A dialectical transition without uplift and ascent, without these gains is simply not dialectical in Hegel's sense.
In its macrostructure too, Hegel's dialectic is, just as much as its ancient predecessors, an ascent, in Hegel's case, an ascent towards the end of absolute knowing. Hegel is a teleologist of the modern world and for him, just as for Aristotle, the final end is the highest and the best. 31 However in Aristotle (as in Plato) dialectical ascent is a movement from concretion and particularity towards increasing abstraction and universality, whereas the movement in Hegel is a d evelopment from abstract particularity to concrete universality (for example the 32 Phenomenology of Spirit traces a path from sense-certainty to absolute knowing.) And indeed, Hegel's teleological metaphysics is structured very differently to Aristotle's. Hegel's system is not pyramidal in form, but circular. In macrostructure the chain of transitions between logical categories (or shapes of consciousness) forms a self-completing circle. Thought thus moves onwards and upwards, and finally comes to itself in the absolute identity of subject and object, where it thinks itself and nothing but itself. So a dialectical transition in Hegel's sense, qua
'speculative' or 'scientific,' is not just a shift upward (in the sense that it is a cognitive gain), for that might be part of a limitless bad infinity based on the elimination of error; it is also a step in a development toward the end, i.e. a moment in a self-completing circle. But this is just to say that Hegel's dialectic is essentially dependent on his systematic Logic and Metaphysics, and it is this that makes it superior, he claims, to the kind of sophistic, skeptical dialectic, which absent the speculative moment remains stuck as it were on the first level, and which he dismisses as "a subjective see-saw system of ratiocination to and fro" (W 8, 172) .
The upshot of all this is that, if we look closely both at the micro and macrostructure of Hegel's dialectic, we see that epistemological cum ontological ascent are essential to it, and this ascent has to be thought of both as movement away from error (or falsity) and progress towards an end. 33
As one would expect, much the same point can be made in respect of Hegel's doctrine of determinate negation. Determinate negation involves two moments. There is the initial negativity, which consists, as we have seen, in the object's or the category's finitude. 34 Recall that for Hegel there is only one absolute spirit and one absolute idea, and it is only here that the object truly and perfectly corresponds to its concept. There is, consequently, an important contrasting sense in which every finite thing, and every finite category is false. This is the first The second moment is the negating power of thought. Thought proceeds negatively by bringing to light the non-correspondence of the object and its concept, by showing that the object, qua finite, fails fully to instantiate the concept. This failure forces thinking to come up with a new and more adequate concept of the object. This process of refinement is not a one way adjustment of thought to thing; rather, Hegel claims, "as the concept changes, so too does the object, for it ! 10 essentially belonged to this object" (PS 54/W 3, 78). The new concept preserves and reconfigures elements of the former concept at a higher level of adequacy. Moreover, something new results from this process, namely a new concept and a new conceptually determined object.
Each determinate negation, the negating power of thought on the inherent negativity of finite categories, and the ontological negativity of finite things, yields a positive result.
The dialectic has a positive result, because it has a determinate content, or because its result is in truth not the empty, abstract nothing, but the negation of certain determinations, which are contained in the result…" (W 8, 177).
So, determinate negation involves not just a cancellation and a preservation of something that already obtains, but also the production of something new, higher and better. 37 Hegel's point of contrast is abstract negation a process by which something is dismissed, as if destroyed. Michael Rosen uses the nice example of the wiping clean of a blackboard, no matter what is written on it. Determinate negation differs in two respects. Unlike abstract negation determinate negation adapts itself to, and engages with, its objects; and unlike abstract negation it produces something new, like the chiseling away of marble (to use the Plotinian metaphor for negation) which always leaves a new shape. Rosen is quite right to insist that the productivity of negation, the positive result, is present from the first moment, not isolated in the second negation, the negation of the negation. However, we must add something to Rosen's account, 38 for negation can be thought of as adaptive and productive, always engaging with its objects and giving rise to new shapes, and yet as a moment of what Hegel thinks of as a bad infinity. As I see it, the positive result is not just the production of a new shape, but, crucially, a gain in determinacy, only because it is both movement away from error and a movement towards the end, the true, or the absolute idea. There can be no determinate negation, and hence no Hegelian dialectic, without uplift and ascent, and no uplift and ascent without Hegel's whole system. What a thing is in truth is unfolded and developed in the context of its relation to all other things, and can properly be known only in its full development. The crowning moment of the logic of the 39 concept is the absolute idea: "the true content is nothing but the whole system, whose development we have all this while been observing" (W 6 389). Now it almost goes without saying that this heavyweight theory is no part of the slender commonplace idea of immanent criticism, which claims only that the critical judgment be based on a standard internal to its object. There is indeed a parallel with how Hegel thinks of negation (both first and second negation) as adaptive to its object, and this feature of Hegelian negation might be considered to be part of the slender idea immanent criticism. For criticism that is immanent also adapts to its object in that it is based on a standard inherent in the object. But the parallel obtains between negation and criticism, and it to be expected because what is true of negation, is also true of immanent criticism qua negative evaluative judgment. However, the further ideas that negation produces a positive result, and the ideas of uplift and ascent that are essential to Hegel's dialectic and its component notions of Aufhebung and determinate negation form no part of the commonplace idea. It was transcendent and not immanent critique that clings rigidly to that standpoint, whose very fixity and arbitrariness of which, philosophy turned against in equal measure.
Transcendent critique sympathizes with authority in its very form…" (HTS 146/GS 5 374).
We have seen that there are two distinct conceptions of immanent criticism: the slender commonplace notion, and the thick Hegelian notion, which occur in the literature from at least 1840 onwards. Adorno does not distinguish between these. Rather, he conflates the two.
Nonetheless, they are distinct and Claim iii of the Continuity Thesis can refer to either notion.
So we must first ask whether Adorno embraces the slender commonplace view. The answer to that question is: Yes, for the most part he does. For example, in an essay written in 1949 he claims: "The procedure is immanent, because it takes the objective idea of a work, whether it is Adorno's explicit statements on the matter, the evidence about whether Adorno does (never mind whether he should) embrace the approach immanent criticism his own is messier and more conflicted than these interpretations would suggest. In an important essay written in 1949 Adorno writes: "The alternatives -either calling culture as a whole into question from outside under the general concept of ideology, or confronting a culture with the norms that it has crystallised out of itself, cannot be recognized by critical theory. To insist on the choice between immanence and transcendence is a relapse into the traditional logic which was the object of Hegel's polemic against Kant" (P 31/ GS10.1, 25). This looks like an acknowledgement that immanent criticism taken alone will not do the job that a critical theory of society asks of it, and has to be supplemented by some form of transcendent criticism.
In (PDM 224/PMP 151). Only the last of these is an explicit endorsement of the virtue of transcendent criticism, but the assertion that philosophy must contemplate things from the standpoint of redemption, and attempt to understand this world in the light of transcendence nevertheless sit ill with the assumptions that he (or his philosophical method) is at bottom Hegelian, and that his method is that of 'immanent criticism' on either conception of it.
Although such passages are less frequent than others where Adorno is happy to play up the Hegelian origins of his thought, and to endorse immanent criticism, they are no less important.
They are deeply rooted in his thought. For this reason, Andrew Buchwalter has gone so far as to argue that Adorno's use of the terminology of 'immanent criticism' is a sleight of hand, since "he embraces a concept of immanence that is little more than a code-word for transcendence." 44 Buchwalter makes two claims. He concludes, controversially, that Adorno is (like Hegel!) an exponent of transcendent critique. But he also allows that Adorno practices immanent critique, for he rejects the idea that criticism if it is not immanent, must be transcendent, and argues that Adorno's considered view is that criticism must be both.
I don't agree with Buchwalter's conclusions, though his interpretation has the merit of being sensitive to discrepant textual evidence and lines of thought that subscribers to the Continuity Thesis ignore or downplay. In my view, transcendent criticism is conceptually opposed to immanent criticism in the commonplace sense. The two cannot be combined. Moreover, transcendent criticism as it is normally conceived, is not such as can be incorporated into immanent criticism in the rich Hegelian sense either, because transcendent criticism is incompatible with Hegelian negation, and determinate negation in particular. Hence, Buchwalter's brave attempt to find a overall interpretation which accounts for all the conflicting evidence, won't wash.
! 16
By contrast my interpretative claim is more modest. I neither claim to be able to identify a point where Adorno makes a clean break with the notion of immanent criticism that he had hitherto endorsed, and switches to transcendent criticism instead; nor do I attribute to Adorno a hybrid conception of criticism that is both immanent and transcendent. My argument is just that from 45 about 1950 onwards, Adorno's begins to doubt the viability of immanent criticism (on either conceptions of it) as an approach to critical social theory, and that these doubts move him to problematize a the conception of criticism that he had hitherto somewhat naively endorsed, and to explore alternatives to it. However, he does not do this consistently. And he does not manage to work out an adequate answer to the problem.
!
14.
So what are the reasons that shake Adorno's confidence in the virtues of immanent criticism? They are two fold. The first is that Adorno becomes sensitive to the implications of his diagnosis of social reality as pervasively evil, that is, to a view of society as a single integrated system that is completely denuded of worthwhile ends, and fully instrumentalized, such that no part of it is immune from complicity with forms of domination that reached their abominable culmination in the Final Solution, and that, in his view, persist also in post-war civil society. I call 46 this position austere negativism. The diagnosis is set out vividly in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) and is the backdrop to Minima Moralia (1951) . In that book it is expressed in hyperbolic aphoristic pronouncements such as:
There is no right living in the false life...
The whole is the untrue…
There is nothing innocuous left…
In my view, these should be read these as literally true statements about what Adorno considers to be an actually existing, though extreme, state of affairs (MM 18, 32, 25) . The same line of thinking occurs in Negative Dialectics (1963) in the idea that the "context of immanence" just is the "context of delusion" namely the very context from which critical theory has to break free
(ND 406/GS 6 393). If society, as Adorno maintains, is a self-maintaining whole, and if it is also pervasively and irredeemably evil; if nothing in it is free from complicity with the atrocities which have taken place in its midst, then the idea that it contains reliable standards of criticism, however conceived, has to be abandoned. To the extent that they are integrated into the context of immanence, standards of criticism, whatever they are, are not transcendent enough. They are not capable of pointing beyond existing relations to a society that, were it to be realized, would be completely different to, and better than, the presently existing one. To the extent that they belong to the object of criticism -society -they are continuous with it and contaminated by it. In which case they are not the appropriate standards for a critical theory of society. Adorno correctly concludes that:
The limit of immanent criticism is that the law of the context of immanence is one with the delusion that has to be overcome. (ND182/GS 6, 183)
In such passages, it seems to me Adorno clearly acknowledges that given austere negativism, a merely immanent criticism of society will not do: for it will not realize the aim of critical theory.
I reiterate that austere negativism puts paid both to the slender commonplace idea of immanent criticism, and to the thick Hegelian one. The former idea must go, because standards of criticism by virtue of their being inherent in a radically and pervasively evil society are eo ipso unsuitable as a basis for that society. It is somewhat harder to see why the idea of immanent criticism as Moreover, this development, Hegel claims, takes place through a process of determinate negation (SL 603/W6, 277-8). Adorno's criticism of Hegel is that, in the final analysis, the requirement of the system to establish the 'identity of identity and non-identity' betrays its aspiration to concrete universality. Particularity and non-identity are sacrificed to the system's demand for unity.
What does not tolerate anything which is not like itself, thwarts the reconciliation for which it mistakes itself. The act of violence of making others equal to oneself reproduced the contradiction which it stamps out. (ND 146)
The very idea of the whole, as Hegel understands it, claims Adorno, "is a perversion of particularity." The unity of the whole is achieved at the price of violence perpetrated against the par 50 -ticulars and that violence, as we shall see, is not just an innocent conceptual violence according to Adorno (HTS 27 perpetrates on particulars (in spite of its aspirations to the contrary) an analogue to the presently existing social system and the real violence it perpetrates on individuals. Hegel's system, he
claims, provides a model for understanding twentieth century totalitarian society avant la lettre, which can help critical theory to unmask and to denounce its mechanisms.
Satanically, the world as grasped by the Hegelian system, has only now, a hundred and fifty years later, proved itself to be a system in the literal sense, namely that of a radically societalized society… A world integrated through "production" through the exchange relationship, depends in all its moments on the social conditions of its production, and in that sense actually realizes the primacy of the whole over its parts, in this regard the desperate impotence of every single individual now verifies Hegel's extravagant conception of the system. (HTS 27/GS5 273)
We should not be distracted by Adorno's tendency to conflate the whole part-relation and the universal particular-relation in Hegel, nor by the fact he claims these conceptual relations prefigure the social domination of individuals in capitalist society, which seems historically and textually cavalier. We must focus on the bottom line: Hegel's philosophy, he writes "sides with the big guns." It is totalitarian and is complicit with actual totalitarianism. This line of criticism, then,
51
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is anything but an immanent criticism, on either conception of it: it is, at bottom, nothing less than a moral and political condemnation.
16.
These, then, are the various reasons why Adorno begins to worry about whether 'immanent criticism' is appropriate for his critical social theory, and they are good reasons. My claim is not just that Adorno has these worries, but that he is right to. He should not endorse 'immanent criticism' in either of the two senses as his approach to critical theory of society. I think that the arguments canvassed above are enough to show convincingly that Adorno's own dialectical cannot be fundamentally Hegelian, in the sense that he cannot help himself to Hegel's own dialectical method, nor to its component ideas.
Moreover, I believe that on rare occasions, in his mature work, Adorno comes to the same realization. Adorno realizes that given his critique of Hegel, and given austere negativism, he must either give the notion of determinate negation, or completely revise it, such that it no longer the Hegelian presuppositions he rejects. For example, at one point Adorno claims that an "anti-dialectical principle" governs "the inmost core of dialectics." (ND 158/GS 6, 161) The principle Adorno has in mind is the Hegelian thesis "that the negation of the negation is positive" which, he claims is an affirmation that "cannot be sustained" (LND, 17). He realizes that what makes a negation determinate according to Hegel, i.e . what gives rise to something new, and not just new but something better and higher, is its being a moment in the development of the absolute idea.
Adorno tends to isolate as an "anti-dialectical principle" the idea that the second negation, the negation of the negation yields a positive result. "The thesis that the negation of a negation is something positive can only be upheld by one who presupposes positivity -as all-conceptuality -from the beginning." (ND160/GS 6, 162) In fact, as we have seen, it is Hegel's idea of negation, tout court that presupposes positivity. This means that Adorno must devise a conception of determinate negation that is quite different from Hegel's, and which does not rely on the "positive postulate…of spirit in which everything is included" if he is to succeed in his aim (LND, 17) . In my view, Adorno comes to the realization of why a new conception of the grounds of de-
terminacy of determinate negation is needed, but never manages to develop an adequate solution.
He does however make two attempts in this direction.
17.
The first is where he canvasses a notion of the false as an 'index of itself and of the true' in explicit contrast to Spinoza's conception of the true. Spinoza's view, which, incidentally Adorno claims to be "characteristic of identity philosophy" -the kind of philosophy Adorno opposes -is that "the true and the false can both be directly read off from the true." Adorno's counterproposal is that the true can be read off "the false, that which should not be" (LND, 29 
